As the world undergoes disruptive geopolitical crises and outright wars in critical trade routes, the case for intra-continental trade is stronger than ever.
Encouragingly, the trade data shows that South Africa is integrating its economy with the rest of the continent’s regional blocs.
The history of regional integration shows that it typically makes the biggest difference when neighbours integrate with one another.
The formation of what eventually became the European Union was led by France and Germany.
They were the two pillars of the European Coal and Steel Community, which became the European Economic Community and eventually the European Union in 1993.
Africa, being geographically larger, is a continent of multiple regions, each with its own unofficial leader: Kenya in the broader East, Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria in the West and Egypt in the North.
They have the largest economies and defence budgets relative to their neighbours. They also have the most to gain or lose from integration, particularly the lowering of tariffs and the removal of non-tariff barriers such as quotas with the advent of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
Given the clear history of regional hegemons leading the process, it is worth reviewing whether the continent’s regional powers are becoming more or less integrated.
Trade data shows that they have yet to hit their stride when it comes to mutual trade. The level of integration among some hegemons is even moving backwards.
Respectively, Africa’s estimated total population of 1.5 billion draws from East Africa (509 million people), West Africa (463 million), Southern Africa (340 million) and North Africa (275 million).
In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia represents a quarter of the regional GDP, as does Kenya in the East African Community (EAC).
In the North, Southern and Western regions of the continent, Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria typically represent about half of the collective regional economies.
Overall, South Africa’s trade with the EAC, North Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) has grown, mainly driven by exports rather than imports.
Exports to the EAC have moved from R30.45 billion in 2015 and R29.8 billion in 2017 to R49.7 billion in 2025.
Thus, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, exports have grown by 66%, whereas there was a minor decline in the years immediately preceding him.
Similarly, growth has been observed in exports to the Maghreb, which encompasses most of North Africa excluding Egypt.
Exports moved from R5.57 billion in 2015 and R2.3 billion in 2017 to R5.6 billion in 2025. These exports have increased by 143% since Ramaphosa’s ascendance.
South African exports to Ecowas moved from R18.44 billion in 2015 and R19.1 billion in 2017 to R28.2 billion in 2025. This represents growth of nearly half under Ramaphosa, compared with 3.8% before he came into office.
So much for the regional aggregates. But how have South Africa’s exports to the regional leaders changed in the past decade and particularly under Ramaphosa?
South Africa’s exports to Ethiopia moved from R1 billion in 2015 to R875 million in 2017 and R1.1 billion in 2025.
By contrast, imports from Ethiopia were valued at R110.3 million in 2015, R109.5 million in 2017 and R225.5 million in 2025.
Overall, South Africa’s exports to Ethiopia increased by 10%, while imports grew by 104% in the Ramaphosa era.
Trade with Egypt declined during the Ramaphosa years. While South African exports stood at R1.6 billion in 2015 and R2.5 billion in 2017, they declined to R1.6 billion in 2025. By comparison, imports from Egypt grew by half.
South Africa’s exports to Kenya grew from R8.3 billion in 2015 to R9.5 billion in 2017 and R11.3 billion in 2025. By contrast, imports from Kenya moved from R241 million in 2015 to R234.1 million in 2017 and R463.9 million in 2025. Thus, South Africa’s exports to Kenya
grew by 18.9% compared with 93.3% for imports.
South Africa’s exports to Nigeria moved from R8.2 billion in 2015 to R5.7 billion in 2017 and R7.8 billion in 2025. By contrast, imports from Nigeria were valued at R37.8 billion in 2015, R22.8 billion in 2017 and R28.5 billion in 2025.
Overall, South Africa’s exports to Nigeria declined by 4.8%, while imports declined by 25% in the Ramaphosa era.
Can the regional hegemons integrate Africa through trade?
Overall, the data paints a mixed picture. For some regional hegemons — Egypt and Nigeria — there is less trade with South Africa than there was a decade ago.
Nevertheless, there has been strong growth with other regional players, especially Ethiopia and Kenya in East Africa.
Encouragingly, the growth in trade with regional communities appears resilient despite declines in trade with some hegemons.
Notably, trade with Ecowas and North Africa has grown despite dips in trade with Nigeria and Egypt, respectively.
African regional hegemons, then, do not appear to hold the keys to their neighbourhoods.
The ongoing global crises and their economic fallout, show that intra-continental trade should be hinged on the production of industrialised and energy exports within the continent.
More than anything else, achieving this is the primary challenge for 21st-century policymaking on the continent.
Bhaso Ndzendze is a professor of politics and international relations and the senior director for global engagement at the University of Johannesburg. He writes in his personal capacity.